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Abstract
Negotiation is a basic mechanism for interaction that
allows the members in a Multiagent System to coordi-
nate their actions and to reach a favorable agreement.
When agents are collaborative, the negotiation process
progresses through a dialogue in which proposals and
counter-proposals are exchanged in a common effort to ad-
vance towards a mutual agreement.
An Interaction Protocol regulates communication and
gives structure to the dialog. Most interaction protocols
designed to regulate negotiation among agents are abstract
models based in some real world negotiation practice (e.g.
auctions). Here we propose a deliberative mechanism for
negotiation among BDI agents based in Argumentation.
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1 Introduction
Negotiation is a basic mechanism for interaction that
allows the members in a Multiagent System to coordi-
nate their actions and to reach a favorable agreement.
When agents are collaborative, the negotiation process
progresses through a dialogue in which proposals and
counter-proposals are exchanged in a common effort to ad-
vance towards a mutual agreement.
An Interaction Protocol regulates communication and
gives structure to the dialog. Most interaction protocols
designed to regulate negotiation among agents are abstract
models based in some real world negotiation practice (e.g.
auctions). Here we propose a deliberative mechanism for
negotiation among BDI agents based on Argumentation.
In a BDI agent, mental attitudes are used to model
its cognitive capabilities. These mental attitudes include
Beliefs, Desires and Intentions among others such as pref-
erences, obligations, commitments, et cetera. These atti-
tudes represent motivations of the agent and its informa-
tional and deliberative states which are used to determine
its behaviour.
In this paper, the mental attitude of an agent will
change as a consequence of its actions and the interaction
in which it will engage with other agents. Each member in
that group will develop plans trying to reach its commit-
ted goals. Some of those goals are proposals, or requests of
collaboration, coming from other members of the group.
Agents will use a formalism based in argumentation in
order to obtain plans for their goals represented by literals.
They will begin by trying to construct a warrant for the
goal. That might not be possible because some needed lit-
erals are not available. The agent will try to obtain those
missing literals, regarded as subgoals, by executing the ac-
tions it has available. When no action can achieve the
subgoals the agent will request collaboration. In making
that request, given the social obligation of being collabo-
rative, the agent will change the intentions of the receiver.
The agent that receives the proposal uses its beliefs and
abilities to respond to the request and, when the negotia-
tion is successful, with an agreement. In that case, it is the
mental attitude of the agent that started the negotiation
that gets modified by the addition of the beliefs needed to
achieve its goals.
When the receiver cannot collaborate, it should inform
whether the reason is that lacks the capabilities to do it or
the reason is that there exists a conflict with its own plans
or intentions. In the latter case, the agent which made the
original request will try to change its plans. If that is not
possible, it will engage in dialog again and it will insist in
its request. Thus, the agent which receives the request will
try to revise its own plans and intentions in an attempt to
collaborate.
In our model, agents cannot use their abilities in order
to change the intentions of other member of the group.
Nevertheless, they can achive that through a dialog. In
that sense, every illocution can be thought as an special
kind of action that can modify the mental attitude of the
receiver. Therefore, the rol of language is fundamental. In
what follows, we propose a set of primitives that support
argumentation-based negotiation among BDI agents.
The paper is organized as follows. Next, in section 2
and 3, we will briefly describe BDI agents and Planning
with Defeasible Argumentation. In section 4 we define a
collaborative Multiagent System and we introduce some
illustrative examples of the basic interaction model. Fi-
nally, in section 5 we propose an interaction protocol and
in section 6 we offer some conclusions and future work di-
rections.
2 The Construction of a BDI
Agent’s Plan
An agent is a computational entity which is capable of
perceiving, reacting, and acting upon an environment. A
rational agent adds a certain level of practical reasoning
to its perceptive, reactive, and effectoric capabilities. This
sort of reasoning [16] allows the agent to select the best
possible action based on knowledge about the goal and
the state of the environment it is in. That is to say, the
agent’s cognitive capability is what will allow it to behave
adequately in each particular context.
Practical reasoning involves two fundamental processes:
decide what goals are going to be pursued, and choose
a plan on how to achieve them. The decision process
requires the consideration of all the alternative options,
the selection of some of these options, and the commitment
to them. The selected options will make up the agent’s
intentions; they will also have an influence on its actions,
restrict future practical reasoning, and persist (in some
way) in time. The planning process consists of selecting a
set of actions that will allow to satisfy the intentions.
An agent will modify its intentions when it decides that
it will not be able to achieve them, or the reasons that
supported their selection among other alternatives are no
longer valid. Thus, an agent’s intentions are linked to its
beliefs about the world that surrounds it.
The belief, desire, and intentions model (BDI), based
on practical reasoning, possesses the necessary elements
for the representation of the mental attitude of a ratio-
nal agent that acts in a dynamic environment, subject to
sudden and frequent changes. Beliefs make up the agent’s
knowledge about the environment that it occupies. Its
desires and intentions refer to the state that it wishes to
achieve, and represent its motivations and commitments.
A BDI agent elaborates a plan considering its beliefs
about the world, its intentions with respect to the desired
state, and its abilities to transform it. Abilities are as-
sociated with actions that have preconditions and conse-
quences. An agent can consider an action only if its beliefs
tell it that the preconditions are satisfied. The application
of an action creates consequences that may modify the set
of beliefs, creating a dynamic and continuous interaction.
A plan is a sequence of actions that, upon execution, pro-
voke changes in the knowledge about the environment.
The individual agent’s plan is built considering only its
beliefs, intentions, and abilities. When an agent is part of
a community, it can ask for collaboration and make use of
the beliefs and abilities of the members of the system in
which it participates.
A social agent’s beliefs are built from its perception
of the world that surrounds it, but they also include its
knowledge about the knowledge of other agents in the
group. Some cognitive elements will be shared by all the
members of the system. Each individual will know these
elements, but will also reason knowing that the others also
know them, and know that they are shared.
Each agent’s knowledge will then gather its own beliefs
and the beliefs shared with other members of the group.
This set of beliefs is consistent; nevertheless, the same may
not be applicable among the sets of different agent’s proper
beliefs. If an agent’s actions are going to modify the shared
beliefs, all of the members of the group must agree.
3 Planning and Argumentation
As mentioned above, a rational agent has certain level of
practical reasoning. This kind of reasoning allows the agent
to select actions to interact with its environment. In this
section we will introduce the necessary definitions of an
argumentation-based formalism to construct plans. For a
more detailed account see [1].
Definition 3.1 [Argumentative BDI agent]
An argumentative BDI agent a will be denoted with the
tuple a = B,D,I,ΓX, where B represents the agent beliefs,
D its desires, I the agent intentions and Γ a set of actions
that the agent is able to execute. ?
The agents desires D will be represented by a set of
literals that will also be called goals. A subset of D will
represent a set of committed goals and will be referred to
as the agent intententions, denoted I.
The agent’s beliefs B will be represented by a a restricted
Defeasible Logic Program (Φ,∆), where Φ will be a consis-
tent set of facts, and ∆ a set of defeasible rules. A brief
description of Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) fol-
lows. For further details of DeLP see [2], and for its re-
stricted version see [3].
In DeLP, a literal h is warranted if there exists a non-
defeated argument A supporting h. An argument struc-
ture A for a literal h (denoted A, hX) is a minimal and
consistent set of defeasible rules that allows to infer h.
In order to establish whether A, hX is a non-defeated
argument, argument rebuttals or counter-arguments that
could be defeaters for A, hX are considered, i.e., counter-
arguments that by some criterion, are preferred to A, hX.
Since counter-arguments are arguments, there may exist
defeaters for them, and defeaters for these defeaters, and
so on. Thus, a sequence of arguments called argumentation
line may appear, where each argument defeats its prede-
cessor in the line. Usually, each argument has more than
one defeater and more than one argumentation line exists.
Therefore, a tree of arguments called dialectical tree is con-
structed, where the root is A, hX and each path from the
root to a leaf is an argumentation line. A dialectical analy-
sis of this tree is used for deciding whether h is warranted.
Besides its beliefs, desires and intentions, an agent will
have a set of actions Γ that it may use to change its world.
The formal definitions that were introduced in [1] are re-
called below.
Definition 3.2 [Action] An action A is an ordered triple
P, X, CX, where P is a set of literals representing precon-
ditions for A, X is a consistent set of literals representing
consequences of executing A, and C is a set of constraints
of the form not L, where L is a literal. We will denote
actions as follows:
{X1, . . . ,Xn} A←− {P1, . . . , Pm}, not {C1, . . . , Ck}
Notice that the notation not {C1, . . . , Ck} represents
{not C1, . . . , not Ck}. ?
Definition 3.3 [Applicable Action] Let B = (Φ,∆) be
an agent’s beliefs. Let Γ be the set of actions available to
that agent. An action A in Γ, defined as before, is applica-
ble if every precondition Pi in P has a warrant built from
(Φ,∆) and every constraint Ci in C fails to be warranted
from (Φ,∆). ?
Definition 3.4 [Action Effect] Let B = (Φ,∆) be an
agent’s beliefs. Let Γ be the set of actions available to
that agent. Let A be an applicable action in Γ defined by:
{X1, . . . ,Xn} A←− {P1, . . . , Pm}, not {C1, . . . , Ck}
The effect of executing A is the revision of Φ by X, i.e.
Φ∗X = Φ∗{X1,...,Xn}.
Revision will consist of removing any literal in Φ that
is complementary of any literal in X and then adding X to
the resulting set. Formally:
Φ∗X = Φ∗{X1,...,Xn} = (Φ− X) ∪ X
where X represents the set of complements of members of
X. ?
It has been shown in [1] that the interaction between
actions and the defeasible argumentation formalism is
twofold. On one hand, as stated by Definition 3.3, defea-
sible argumentation is used for testing preconditions and
constraints through the construction of the necessary war-
rants. On the other hand, actions may be used by agents
in order to change the world and then obtain a warrant
for a literal h that is not warranted from its current beliefs
(Φ,∆).
When an agent a selects an intention g from I, and g is
not warranted from (Φ,∆), agent a may look for an action
A in Γ that modifies the set of beliefs in such a way that
an argument without defeaters can be obtained to support
g. If A cannot be executed because its preconditions are
not warranted, a can look for a sequence of actions that
will allow it to establish them. The complete sequence,
including A, will make up a plan for g. Each action can
modify the set of beliefs adding literals that will allow the
construction of new arguments.
In the construction of a plan actions are chosen so that,
when executed, will allow to introduce literals necessary
to obtain warrants. Warrants are also obtained to support
preconditions that will allow the execution of actions. Ac-
tion selection is not a trivial task, and the classic planning
problems are reflected in the argumentative schema. In a
sequence of actions [A1,A2], A2 may be applicable accord-
ing to the initial state Φ, but not after A1 is executed.
Therefore, the consequences of A1 may modify Φ in such a
way that the preconditions of A2 are not warranted. The
execution of A1 may add literals that allow the construc-
tion of new defeaters for the preconditions of A2 and elim-
inate literals that allow the construction of warrants for
the preconditions of A2. An analysis on Progression and
Regression Planning in the context of this formalism can
be found in [1].
When planning is performed as a collaborative process,
an agent which forms part of a group could select an action
that may interfere with the rest of the members’ plans. As
its behavior should be collaborative, it will ask for permis-
sion to introduce changes that may affect others. Next, we
will explore some of the situations that appear during the
interaction of this type of agents.
4 Collaborative Agents
The behavior of an isolated agent is determined by its
individual motivations, its beliefs about the world, and
its own abilities. This characterization is insufficient for
the modeling of an agent that interacts in a social context
with a cooperative attitude.
A social agent’s beliefs are built from the agent’s per-
ception of the environment and there will be some shared
cognitive elements among all the members of the system.
Each individual will know these elements, and will reason
knowing that the rest also knows them, and know that
they are shared [5].
Definition 4.1 [Collaborative MAS]
A collaborative Multi-Agent System will be a pair [Φs,A],
where A is a set of argumentative BDI agents, and Φs is
the set of shared beliefs. ?
The knowledge of each member of the system is incom-
plete and frequently is insufficient for the deduction of a
specific fact from it. This fact could be deduced by gather-
ing all the distributed knowledge in the group. The group
is heterogenous, and therefore its members have different
abilities. Each of them builds plans from its own sets of ac-
tions. When it asks for collaboration, another member of
the group may execute actions to satisfy the requirement.
In this work, we will reduce the cardinality of set A to
two agents. This simplification will allow us to concentrate
on the essential problems of interaction. It is clear that the
introduction of more members to the group will bring new
complications, and these will be the subject of future work.
Example 4.1 Let [Φs,A] be a group integrated by two
collaborative agents, a1 = B1,D1, I1,Γ1X and a2 =
B2,D2,I2,Γ2X defined as:
Φs = {a, b}
B1 = (Φ1,∆1) where Φ1 = {c,∼d, e} and
∆1 = {(p –< c, h, q), (q –< b,∼d), (r –< c, s), (s –< f)}
Γ1 = {{f} A1←− {a, e}, not {}}
B2 = (Φ2,∆2) where Φ2 = {h,∼i} and
∆2 = {(u –< a, v), (v –< b, j), (w –< h)}
Γ2 = {{j,∼a} A2←− {b,∼i}, not {}}
Suppose that D1 = {p, r} is a1’s set of goals and I1 =
{p} is the set of committed goals. Agent a1 is not capable
of constructing a warrant for p using its own beliefs and
the shared beliefs, but it could do it if it gathered all of its
beliefs with those of a2. ?
The aggregation of the whole group’s beliefs in one set
would invalidate the advantages of working with a com-
munity of agents. The whole model could in that case
colapse to just one agent. A more interesting alternative,
which also respects the paradigm, is that agents interact
asking for cooperation when the set of beliefs they can use
is insufficient.
The group may be heterogenous and all the members
of the group can benefit if they cooperate. Agents have a
collaborative attitude; they offer their beliefs and abilities
to the rest of the group and they can, on the other hand,
request the knowledge necessary to carry out an action to
build a warrant by themselves.
Social contact requires some capability for resolving con-
flicts that may be introduced by the interaction. In exam-
ple 4.1, if a2 has the intention of constructing a warrant
for v, it may decide to execute A2, and j will become a
fact and v will be warranted. A2’s side-effect will be to
change the shared beliefs, removing a.
ΦIs = {∼a, b} ΦI2 = {h,∼i, j}
The decision of a2 may be in conflict with a1’s plan in
the case that this agent has the intention of executing A1
to build a warrant that will support r.
Agents are autonomous, and this quality is reflected in
the fact that none of them will be able to execute actions
that can directly modify other agents’ beliefs. On the other
hand, all of the members of the group can modify the
shared beliefs. Moreover, each agent maintains consistency
between its own beliefs and the shared ones, but it cannot
control consistency between other agents’ beliefs and the
shared ones. Social interaction requires that each agent
communicate with the rest before executing an action that
may affect the group’s beliefs.
4.1 Negotiating Beliefs
An agent a1 can ask for collaboration when it has commit-
ted to an intention g of I1 and, to build an argument to
support it, it requires a literal l. Agent a1 cannot find a
warrant for l using belief sets B1 and Φs nor can it elabo-
rate a sequence of actions that allow it to build a warrant.
Therefore, it asks for assistance from another member of
the group. An agent a2 then receives a proposal from a1
with respect to l, and the literal l is added to its set of
intentions.
The following example will allow us to illustrate differ-
ent situations, shown below as different cases produced by
varying the set of committed intentions.
Example 4.2 Let [Φs,A] be a group composed of two
collaborative agents, a1 = B1,D1,I1,Γ1X and a2 =
B2,D2,I2,Γ2X where:
Φs = {a, b}
B1 = (Φ1,∆1) where Φ1 = {c,∼d, e} and
∆1 = {(p –< a, h), (q –< c, f), (r –< b,∼d),
(s –< e,∼d, g), (t –< a, k)}
Γ1 = {({f} A1←− {e, r, h}, not {}),
({g} A2←− {∼d, j}, not {})}
B2 = (Φ2,∆2) where Φ2 = {h,∼i} and
∆2 = {(u –< a, v), (v –< b), (∼v –< w), (w –< h),
(∼w –< ∼i), (x –< h,∼i, j)}
Γ2 = {({j} A3←− {a, h, u}, not {}),
({k} A4←− {b, x}, not {})}
?
In the simplest case, a2 knows l and the request can be
taken directly adding l to the set of committed beliefs and
notifying a1. More complex cases are introduced below.
Case 1 below shows that when the group is conformed
by only two agents, and one of them can satisfy a proposal
without executing any actions, the change in Φs will not
introduce any conflicts, because the only literal that is
being added is exactly the one that was required. If the
group were larger, a conflict may arise with the beliefs of
the rest of the members.
Case 1 Let D1 = {p, q, s, t} be a1’s set of goals, and I1 =
{p} the set of committed goals. In order to build a warrant
for p, a1 needs h and makes a request to a2. The literal is
in the beliefs of a2, so the response is immediate. and the
beliefs are modified accordingly:
ΦIs = {a, b, h} ΦI2 = {∼i}
Now, a1 can build an argument A1a1 = { p –< a, h }
that supports p, since A1a1 has no counterarguments that
defeats it, therefore p is warranted. ?
The following case shows a different situation where an
agent may request a literal because that literal is part of
the preconditions of an action that agent needs to execute.
Case 2 Let D1 = {p, q, s, t} be a1’s set of goals and
I1 = {q} the set of committed goals. In order to build
a warrant for q, a1 needs f and its reasoning indicates
that if it were to execute A1 the literal f would be
added to Φ1. Nevertheless, one of A1’s preconditions is
not satisfied. The literal e belongs to Φ1, the argument
A1a1 = {r –< b,∼d} supports r, but its not possible for
a1 to build a warrant for the precondition h. Therefore, it
makes a proposal to a2 requesting h. The literal is in the
beliefs of a2, so the response is immediate and the beliefs
are modified as before:
ΦIs = {a, b, h} ΦI2 = {∼i}
Now, a1 can execute A1, generate Φ1I = {c,∼d, e, f}
and build an argument A1a1 = {q –< c, f} that supports
q. A1a1 has no counterarguments that defeat it, so q is
warranted. ?
In case 3 a1 requests l but the literal does not belong
to Φ2, so a2 tries to execute an action that will allow it to
add l to the set of shared beliefs.
Case 3 Let D1 = {p, q, s, t} be a1’s set of beliefs and
I1 = {s} the set of committed goals. In order to build
a warrant for s, it needs g and its reasoning indicates that
if it were to execute A2, the literal g would be added to
Φ1. Notwithstanding, one of A2’s preconditions is not sat-
isfied; its knowledge does not allow it to warrant j. Then,
a1 makes a proposal to a2 requiring j.
The literal j is not in a2’s beliefs, but its intention is to
collaborate with a1, so it decides to execute A3 and then
modify the shared beliefs into ΦIs = {a, b, j}.
Note that A3’s preconditions are the literals a, h and u.
The first two belong to Φs and Φ2 respectively, while u is
supported by A1a2 = {(u –< a, v), (v –< b)}. But A1a2 is
defeated by A2a2 = {(∼v –< w), (w –< h)} that attacks
v. A2a2 is defeated by A3a2 = {∼w –< ∼i}. Then, u is
warranted because it is supported by the argument A1a2
that only has one defeaterA2a2 which is defeated byA3a2
and this last argument has no defeaters.
Now, a1 can execute A2, generate Φ1I = {c,∼d, e, g}
and build and argument A1a1 = {s –< e,∼d, g} that sup-
ports s. ?
Frequently, a2’s work cannot be limited to finding a sim-
ple action that allows it to add l to Φs. To satisfy a1’s
proposal, the agent may need to find a plan in which l is
one of the consequences of the last action in the sequence.
This situation is shown below.
Case 4 Let D1 = {p, q, s, t} be a1’s set of goals a1 and
I1 = {t} the set of shared beliefs. In order to build an
argument with no defeaters that supports t, a1 needs k.
Because the literal is not part of its knowledge, it asks
for collaboration from a2. a2’s reasoning leads it to the
decision that it will not be able to collaborate with a1 by
executing only one action, but it can elaborate a plan in
which the first action will allow it to add to its beliefs the
preconditions of the second one.
Then, a2 decides to execute A4, which has x among
its preconditions. In order to obtain a warrant for x, a2
needs j. As before, the literal j is not in its beliefs, but it
can execute A3, now to modify its own beliefs obtaining
ΦI2 = {h,∼i, j}
As a result a2 can execute A4 and modify the shared
knowledge ΦIs = {a, b, k}. Then a1 builds an argument
with no defeaters for its committed goal t. ?
4.2 Proposals and Counterproposals
Suppose that a1 requests a literal l to a2 and that a2 can
satisfy the request but to do so it will need another literal
m. In this case, a2 will make a counterproposal, asking m
to a1. If a1 is capable of satisfying that request for m, it
wll add m to the set of shared beliefs. In any case, a1 will
notify a2 the result of the interaction (see Section 5).
Example 4.3 Let [Φs,A] be a group conformed by two
collaborative agents, a1 = B1,D1,I1,Γ1X and a2 =
B2,D2,I2,Γ2X as defined below:
Φs = {a, b}
B1 = (Φ1,∆1) where Φ1 = {c,∼d, e} and
∆1 = {(p –< a, q), (q –< c, f), (r –< b, e), (s –< b, c)}
Γ1 = {({f} A1←− {e, j}, not {}), ({g} A2←− {∼d}, not {})}
D1 = {p, s} is a1’s set of goals and I1 = {p} the set of
committed goals.
B2 = (Φ2,∆2) where Φ2 = {h,∼i} and
∆2 = {(u –< a,∼i), (v –< j)}
Γ2 = {{j} A3←− {b, h, u, g}, not {}}
To reach p, a1 needs to build an argument that supports
it, and its reasoning capability leads it to decide that it
must execute action A1. In order to satisfy this action’s
preconditions, it makes a proposal to a2 requiring j. This
agent can only add j if it executes A3, but in order to do
so it needs g.
Agent a2 does not know g and it isn’t capable of execut-
ing an action that will allow it to reach it. Nevertheless,
it can ask for collaboration from a1 by means of a coun-
terproposal. When a1 receives the request, it decides to
execute A2, it adds g to the set of shared beliefs, and it
communicates with a2 to signal the completion.
When a2 receives a1’s response, it executes A3, modifies
the shared beliefs, and communicates one again. At the
end of the process, the set of shared beliefs will be ΦIs =
{a, b, j, g}. ?
In each of the cases analyzed so far, the negotiation
ended successfully. During the search process, the agents
have been able to find actions favorable to both. Evidently,
this is not the only possible situation.
The negotiation can fail because of several reasons. It
could be that in trying to collaborate one of the agents will
introduce unexpected side-effects. Another reason is that
the knowledge is not enough to build a plan, or because
there is conflict among the agents’ beliefs. In the following
sections we will show examples that illustrate these cases.
4.3 Side-effects
The actions executed in order to change the world can
modify the shared beliefs and thus produce unplanned
side-effects. The example below illustrate that problem.
Example 4.4 Let [Φs,A] be a group conformed by two
collaborative agents, a1 = B1,D1, I1,Γ1X and a2 =
B2,D2,I2,Γ2X as defined below:
Φs = {a, b,∼c}
B1 = (Φ1,∆1) where Φ1 = {∼d, e}
∆1 = {(p –< b, j), (q –< e, f)}
Γ1 = {{f} A1←− {a,∼d,∼c, k}, not {}}
D1 = {p, q}
B2 = (Φ2,∆2) where Φ2 = {h,∼i}
∆2 = {(u –< a, v), (v –< b, h)}
Γ2 = {({j,∼b} A2←− {∼i}, not {}),
({k, c} A3←− {u}, not {})}
If I1 = {p}, in order to achieve its intention, a1 can
ask for collaboration from a2, requiring j. a2 reasons and
decides to execute A2, and modifies the shared beliefs into
ΦIs = {a,∼b,∼c, j}.
Agent a1 requested j in order to build a warrant for p,
but it also needed b to do so, which is no longer part of
the set of shared beliefs.
Another way that conflict may arise appears when I1 =
{q}. The agent a1 decides to execute A1 in order to build
a warrant for q. The action requires k as a precondition,
and a1 asks for collaboration from a2. a2 is not capable of
directly constructing an argument that supports k either,
but it can execute A2 and add k to Φs. After executing
A2, the shared beliefs are modified, because k and c are
added.
Note that agent a1 had requested k with the intention
of executing A1, but now the precondition ∼c is no longer
part of the set of shared beliefs. ?
To avoid harming a1’s plans with its actions, a2 can
communicate to a1 its intention of adding or removing a
literal from Φs, besides of the one specified in the proposal.
The request tends to assure mutual benefit.
When a1 receives the request, it analyzes if the modifi-
cation that a2 proposes provokes any conflicts with its own
knowledge, or with the action that it intends to execute.
In any case, it communicates with a2 to accept or reject
the request. If a1 accepts, a2 executes the sequence of ac-
tions that allow the addition of l to the shared knowledge,
and it communicates again to indicate that its task was
successful.
4.4 Failure in the Negotiation
The simplest case of failure is produced when an agent
receives a proposal and it cannot satisfy it because of lack
of knowledge for the execution of appropriate actions.
Example 4.5 Let [Φs,A] be a group conformed of two
collaborative agents, a1 = B1,D1,I1,Γ1X and a2 =
B2,D2,I2,Γ2X where:
Φs = {a, b}
B1 = (Φ1,∆1) where Φ1 = {c,∼d} and
∆1 = {(p –< c, q), (q –< b, e), (r –< c, s), (s –< f, j)}
Γ1 = {{f} A1←− {a,∼d}, not {}}
D1 = {p, r}
B2 = (Φ2,∆2) where Φ2 = {h,∼i} and
∆2 = {(u –< a, v), (v –< b, j), (w –< h)}
Γ2 = {{j} A2←− {b,∼i, g}, not {}}
If a1’s set of committed goals is I1 = {p}, a1 can make
a proposal to a2 in reference to e. The agent a2 cannot
accept the proposal, and it cannot elaborate a counterpro-
posal either. It then communicates to end the negotiation.
A somewhat more complicated situation presents itself
when the agent that receives the proposal can elaborate
counterproposal, but it is rejected. If I1 = {r}, the agent
a1 makes a proposal to a2 referred to j. The agent a2
decides that it can execute an action that will allow it to
add j to the shared knowledge, but it needs g in order to do
so. It then makes a counterproposal, but a1 cannot accept
the proposal, and can’t elaborate a counterproposal either.
It then communicates to inform the failure and ends the
negotiation. ?
The negotiation can fail, as in the previous examples,
because of a2’s lack of knowledge and capacity to elabo-
rate a successful plan for l. Another reason for failure is
produced when there is inconsistency among a1’s proposal
with respect to l, to achieve its intention g, and a2’s knowl-
edge, committed goals, or proper plans. In any case, a1’s
plan fails, and it must try to elaborate a new one. If all
of the plans for g require l, agent a1 may insist with its
proposal, forcing a2 to revise its own plans.
In order to be able to collaborate with a1, agent a2 has
to revise its own plans too, trying to eliminate the source
of conflict. If it achieves this, it accepts the offer, but if it
fails, it notifies its failure again. If this is not possible, it
can demand a revision of intentions from a2. It is clear that
the dialogue requires a sufficiently expressive language so
that each agent can express its attitude in the negotiation.
5 Communication Languages
The success of an application developed from the agent
model depends considerably on the agents’ ability to com-
municate. In this sense, the role of the communication lan-
guage, ACL, is a fundamental one because it allow them
to interact and share knowledge. Even though technically
the communication takes place by messages over a network
that uses a low level protocol, on a conceptual level agents
do not exchange messages, but they maintain conversa-
tions based on its purposes. The specification of an ACL
comprises of three levels [15]:
• An Interaction Protocol
• An Interaction Language
• A Language for representing Shared Beliefs
Each agent’s interaction protocol is a conversation pat-
tern that governs its interaction with other agents and
allows to structure the communication. The interaction
language is the medium through which agents communi-
cate attitudes and exchange knowledge. The interaction
language must allow agents to assist other agents, demand
services, relay tasks and control its execution, commit to
or reject the execution of some tasks, report its evolution
and the final success or failure.
The language for the representation of shared knowledge
should guarantee the preservation of the semantics. That
is to say, a concept, object, or entity will have a uniform
meaning in different applications, even when it is refer-
enced through different names. An alternative for main-
taining a body of shared knowledge about a domain is
through an ontology. Our proposal for an interaction pro-
tocol considers that the participants in that interaction will
exchange proposals and counterproposals trying to reach
a general agreement.
5.1 An Interaction Protocol
Negotiation can be thought of as a distributed search
process over a space consisting of potential agreements.
In the majority of the cases, only a portion of the search
space will satisfy each particular agent’s desires. An agent
makes a proposal within the space of acceptable agree-
ments. Another member of the group receives it and may
accept it, reject it, or make a counterproposal. In this last
case, the first agent analyzes it again and may once again
accept it, reject it, or make a counterproposal.
Acceptance indicates that a point of shared agreement
has been reached. Rejection implies that the negotiation
ended without success. In the process, it is possible that
one or both participants will have to yield and compromise;
nevertheless, if a state of acceptance is reached, the agree-
ment must be favorable for both. Under this metaphor,
the negotiation requires that the agents have certain min-
imal capabilities. They must be able to:
• Make a proposal within the space of acceptable situ-
ations
• Accept or reject a proposal
• Elaborate a counterproposal
The words used may have an influence in the effective-
ness of a message. The use of expressions like insist or
demand imply greater vehemence. Notwithstanding, the
acceptance will not only depend on the words, but also
on the mental attitude of the receiver with respect to the
request.
The dialogue is then initiated with proposal in while an
agent a1 requires from another agent a2 a literal p so it can
execute a plan for q. Agent a2 can accept the proposal, at-
tend to the requirement and it adds p to the shared knowl-
edge. Alternatively, a2 can reject the proposal because p is
in conflict with its own plan to achieve r. In that case, a1
tries to elaborate another plan for q that does not require
p, but if it cannot achieve that it can insist with its re-
quirement. In the face of this insistence, a2 seeks another
plan for r that is not in conflict with p. If it finds it, it ac-
cepts the requirement and adds p to the shared knowledge.
In the other case, it rejects the proposal again.
Agent a1 then revises its intentions, but if it decides
to persist in q, it can demand p to a2. This agent then
revises its own intentions, and tries to abandon its reasons
for trying to reach r, committing to a new goal s for which
it can elaborate a plan without conflicts wit p.
5.2 Interaction Language
An interaction language for BDI agents should be able
to express mental attitudes like beliefs, desires, and in-
tentions. In this way, the essential functions offered by
an interaction language should retain much of the aspects
that allow humans to communicate.
Philosophers and linguists have developed a formal
model for human communication known as Speech Act
Theory [17, 18]. This model has served as a base for the
development of languages that are oriented towards com-
munication in Multiagent Systems [19, 20, 21].
Interaction languages based on Speech Act Theory cap-
ture the essential characteristics of human communication
and transport them to an adequate model for the develop-
ment of artificial agents. The idea is to recognize all the
internal aspects of an artificial autonomous entity, con-
sidering in particular the changes that are made when it
interacts with others.
An essential idea in the theory is that a communication
is a special class of action. When an agent communicates,
it doesn’t only express sentences that may be true or false,
but it also executes actions such as requirements, sugges-
tions, promises, etc. The speech act is the minimum unit
of communication. Every expression is a speech act and
denotes an action at the same time.
An interaction language among agents, based on the
theory of speech acts, is comprised of a set of communica-
tion primitives. Generally, it is possible to define a set of
primitives that captures the essential aspects of commu-
nication, independent from the application domain. The
semantic description of this set yields a communication
model.
The selection of a set of primitives is related to the
knowledge representation language. If every system is de-
veloped from one content specification language, the set of
interaction language primitives can be reduced. If, on the
other hand, different languages are used in the communi-
cation of contents, the set of primitives should be larger.
In the same way, if an interaction language is going to be
used in the implementation of applications in different do-
mains (in which different content specification languages
are used), the set should be versatile enough to cover all
of this diversity.
5.3 Negotiation Primitives
During the negotiation, a dialogue is established in which
the agents exchange messages that express proposals and
counter-proposals. These messages are actions that try to
modify the mental attitude of the other participant in the
dialogue. Therefore, we say communicative acts to express
the fact that communication is a particular type of action.
The simplest negotiation primitives are:
• Requests Add(s, h, p) Agent s will modify the
shared knowledge, but in order to do so it needs au-
thorization from h.
• Authorize Add(s, h, p) Agent s received a request
from h, which needs to add p to the shared knowledge;
s does not find conflict, so it authorizes the request.
• Require(s, h, p) Agent s needs p and requests to h
the addition to the shared knowledge.
• Insist(s, h, p) Agent s needs p and request to h the
addition to the shared knowledge, even when it must
reformulate its own plans.
• Demand(s, h, p) Agent s needs p and request to h
the addition to the shared knowledge, even when it
must modify its intentions.
• Accept(s, h, p) Agent s received a requirement from
h, asking it to add p to the shared knowledge, s is
capable of doing it, so it accepts the proposal.
• Reject(s, h, p) Agent s received a requirement from
h, asking it to add p to the shared knowledge, s is not
capable of doing it, so it rejects the proposal because
it is in conflict with its own intentions.
• Unable(s, h, p) Agent s received a requirement from
h, asking it to add p to the shared knowledge, s is
not capable of doing it because it has not enough
knowledge.
Both participants are interested in reaching an agree-
ment ad have a cooperative attitude. The more informa-
tion a counterproposal has, the faster the process (and the
negotiation) will be. If ∼q is part of the shared knowledge,
and s needs p as part of a plan to reach q, it can commu-
nicate its intention to h, avoiding future conflicts. Some
of the primitives are extended to include the intention of
the agent in the message:
• Require for(s, h, p, q)
• Insist for(s, h, p, q)
• Demand for(s, h, p, q)
Each agent has partial knowledge about the world and
partial knowledge about the mental state of the rest of
the agents. When an agent includes an argument in its
proposal or counterproposal it is in some way showing part
of its mental state.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we proposed a negotiation protocol between
two BDI agents, in which both participants maintain a
conversation while trying to make their initially divergent
interests converge. If the process is successful, the com-
munication ends when a shared agreement is reached.
Initially, an agent makes a request asking for another
agent’s knowledge in order to obtain a goal of its own.
The receiver has a collaborative attitude, so it tries to co-
operate. If it is successful, it modifies the set of shared
beliefs. If there is a conflict, the dialogue continues, and
each of the participants shows part of its mental attitude
and tries to influence the other agent’s plans and prefer-
ences. The communicative acts are actions that in some
way provoke changes in the environment’s state.
The negotiation’s success depends considerably on the
agents’ ability for communicating and exchanging knowl-
edge. In this sense, the language’s role is fundamental;
its expresiveness determines the sender’s capacity to spec-
ify the message’s emphasis, and the receiver’s capacity to
choose a course of action that is compatible with its func-
tion.
This work proposes specific negotiation primitives that
can have an influence on the effectiveness of the commu-
nicative acts that are exchanged in a dialogue. The mental
attitude of the receiver will be considered the each pro-
posal, and so will the type of communicative act used in
the request.
The interaction between the agents could be consider-
ably enhanced if the context provides some norms that
would allow the establish general agreements about the
behavior. The norms don’t only force the individuals to
act in a specific way, but they also condition their social
behavior and structure their interaction with the rest of
the agents. The proposed model will be extended to re-
flect the impact of the norms, roles, and relationships in
the negotiation process.
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